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News Release


Chris Patten

No. 19/04
February 17, 2004

PATTEN PONDERS THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP   Chris Patten, EU Commissioner for External Relations gave a wide-ranging speech on the state of transatlantic relations at Oxford University.  According to Commissioner Patten, who will be in Washington March 1, neither America nor Europe can go it alone in dealing with global challenges like terrorism. Both sides need to resist the caricatures and clichés that surfaced during the debate about Iraq and must work to make a partnership that has proved its worth and necessity more effective.  

Commissioner Patten’s speech is available online at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp04_77.htm 

Europe and the US: Cousins and Strangers 

“There was never a golden age in Trans-Atlantic relations when all Europeans took their hats off to the super-power that defended our freedom…The notion that the relationship has changed, is changing or ought to change claims varied paternity. There are those who argue that the hour of Europe's and America's triumph, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid disintegration of Russia's European empire, marked the moment when Europe no longer mattered so much geo-strategically to the USA. The rise of Asia—the pumping, thumping economies of China, Japan, South Korea and now India—drew America's attention to its west and our east. Above all, it is suggested that the growing disproportion in the military might of Europe and America reflects a fundamental difference of view between the continents. Europe's will to use force in order to safeguard freedom has been sapped by too much past experience of the calamitous results of interstate violence and too much recent experience of comfortable prosperity. Militarily weaker by choice and by taxpayer demand, we Europeans recoil from using arms to solve problems except as a last resort. Our appetite for negotiation, for soft not hard power, and our contention that this approach is morally superior to the American, is a flight from responsibility, only available as a political option because we can always count on Uncle Sam to keep us safe and to bear the civilised world's burden. In short, as the neo-conservative Robert Kagan argued, Europe is Venus and America Mars.” 

Critical Allies Nevertheless… 

“The Bush administration's policies, too, have touched and turned opinion in Europe and beyond. This is hardly surprising after all, they are plainly controversial in America, polarising opinion there, so why should the same not be true here?…But whatever the decibel level of the criticism, whatever the quantity of genetically modified tomatoes with which Europe and the United States pelt one another, politicians often take a break from the fun to remind people that "there is so much more that unites than divides us." It is a truism: the stuff of a thousand unread communiqués. But like many truisms, it also happens to be true. For the United States and Europe are indeed more than close allies. We have common roots in the European enlightenment and share the body of ideas which emerged from that period of emancipation from received authority. We made common sacrifice of blood and treasure in defence of freedom in two World Wars. We were together on Golgotha, "citizens of death's grey land/Drawing no dividend from time's tomorrow."  

The Fruits of Indispensable Partnership 

“Our economic interdependence is such that the whole world has a large stake in our success, just as we have a stake in each other's. Taken together our Gross Domestic Product pretty evenly divided adds up to about 20 trillion dollars, just over 40 percent of the world's total; our combined share of world trade is only a little less. For all the talk about the importance of NAFTA and Asian tigers, American investment in the pretty small Netherlands over the last 8 years was twice as great as in Mexico and 10 times as large as in China. Europe accounts for half of the total global earnings of US companies and Europe has more investment in Texas than America has in Japan. So the relationship can be counted in jobs, growth and living standards, not only on either side of the Atlantic but far beyond. We should build on that mutual strength by building an ever deeper commercial relationship and we should work together to ensure a successful outcome to the WTO's Doha Development Round.”  

Where Do We Go From Here

"The bald question I wish to answer is this: Has the relationship served its purpose? Has success rendered it passé? Can we all in Europe, America, the world do without it? Is it just temporarily under the weather, and if so how can we nurse it back to robust health?

"The rows do not seem to have persuaded either party to call it a day. According to the latest Trans-Atlantic trends survey of the German Marshall Fund published in September 2003, 'the Trans-Atlantic split over war in Iraq has undermined America's standing with Europeans.' Also, 'the Iraq war appears to have unleashed a stronger backlash effect on European views of the United States than the other way around.' But the survey goes on to note that a key message is that 'allies can feel estranged and share foreign policy interests that lead them to work together.' Perhaps surprisingly 'a majority of Americans want to see the European Union become a superpower capable of sharing global responsibilities with the US. When the 37% who favoured the EU as a superpower were asked if this would still be the case if the EU sometimes opposed US policies, 83% of them said "yes"… A majority of Europeans appear to want an Atlanticist EU serving as a partner to the US. Americans remain multilateralists and fear the consequences of unilateral policies.' There is, additionally, 'an overwhelming consensus across the Atlantic that the EU's soft (non-military) power has a role to play. Moreover, both Europeans and Americans want to strengthen the UN although a majority of Americans support by-passing the world organisation 'if vital interests are at stake.'"  

Terrorism 

“The terrible events of September 11th 2001 initially drew Europe and America more closely together. But more recent events seem to have driven us apart, with Europe not perhaps fully appreciating the extent of the US trauma the sense of violation. The subsequent "war on terrorism" has been understood in Europe as a metaphor: a phrase to describe the myriad responses required of the civilized world to address problems that do not admit of definitive solutions, let alone of military ones. America, by contrast, has really felt itself to be at war, and it is a war that ratcheted up patriotic sentiment to unparalleled heights.  

"Terrorism is abhorred in Europe. We have every reason to hate it. Look at ETA in Spain. Or the cold-blooded murder of Stephen Saunders, the British Defence Attaché, by the 17 November Movement in Greece 3 years ago. I have witnessed at first hand the bloody consequences of Irish terrorism. I have also had reason to resent past indulgence by some Americans of its champions and paymasters on the other side of the Atlantic.  

"So we hate terrorism. But we are also uncomfortable with the one-dimensional nature of the debate in some quarters, the unwillingness to accept that terrorists might, on occasion, be using abhorrent means to pursue ends that we may or may not agree with, but which are susceptible to reason, and whose causes can be addressed without a war. It is as if any discussion of the causes of alienation and hatred was evidence of appeasement. The idea of a world divided between good and evil between us and them sits uncomfortably with most Europeans. Throughout recorded time, asymmetric threats have been the weapon of the weak against the strong and we find them sanctioned by history when the cause is just, the means proportionate and the outcome good. The morality is not always clear.  

"Do not misunderstand me. I am not in any sense seeking to excuse or even to explain the outrage of 9/11. The cause was unjust. The means abominable. But these issues cannot be placed beyond rational discussion. Nor, in my view, can terrorism ever be eradicated from the face of the earth. Complete elimination of the threat could only be achieved in an Orwellian police state that denied individual freedom. That would negate the values for which the US and EU stand. Paradoxically, it would also demand of good men the sort of just resistance and potentially violent resistance that it was seeking to eliminate. I have no doubt that the most important way that we Europeans can act as allies of the United States is by convincing them of the complexities and subtleties of the war against terrorism, pursuing it effectively on the basis of international law and with the authority of a more effective UN and discouraging America from taking Machiavelli's advice that 'it is better to be feared than loved.' For the world's only super-power that is very bad advice.”  

What Europe Needs to Do 

"To be more effective partners, we in Europe have to make clear that we are not rivals, defining our European-ness in terms of hostility to America. Those countries of Central and Eastern Europe who will be joining the European Union in May have plainly made an existential choice. It is a European choice. But that does not make it an anti-American choice. More Europe in the world would not necessarily mean less America though I suspect that a lot of Americans wish that it did.  

"We have to be better at managing the partnership, a proposition that goes for both sides. We should try not to surprise each other and should recognise that democratic pressures can bend and twist rhetoric and decisions from Kansas to Cologne.  

"Europeans will be taken as more serious partners if we can rid ourselves of the slightly unfair reputation of being 'free riders,' unprepared to pay more for our own security so long as we can depend on America's shield. Our military contribution, for example to peace-keeping, is constantly under-estimated, but while we clearly pull our weight in the exercise of 'soft power' (development assistance and so on), it is difficult to argue the same for the harder sort. I do not myself believe that we can, or should try to, close the gap significantly between American and European military spending. Europe's contribution whether measured in billions of dollars or in percentage of GDP is about half that of America. We should try to spend rather more, but more significantly we should spend better. Too much of our commitment is designed to fight the last war that never was, and we lack even basic modern equipment like air-lift capacity. The ability to add more relevant military capacity to our other instruments for preventing crises, and coping with them when they turn into conflict, would make us more valued interlocutors and partners in the American-led fight against terrorism.” 

What America Needs To Do 

“A sensible American strategy towards Europe will recognise the power of her values and ideas, for us as well as others in the world, in underpinning her global leadership. It should also comprehend that it would be a terrible mistake to reverse 50 years of American policy and to countenance the disaggregation rather than the integration of Europe. Europe will be for a time a weaker partner if the United States chooses to drive wedges between member states issue by issue. This is not a policy likely to prosper for long; the disciplines of willingly shared sovereignty are likely to prevail. But it would leave behind a lot of bad feeling. An effective and coherent Europe is a better partner in the Magreb, the Mashraq and the Wider Middle East, a better partner in the world's other hot spots.  

"If America recognises that mighty as she is, she cannot cope alone with the threats to her prosperity and security drugs, organised crime, terrorism, epidemic disease, terror technology, collapsing and already failed states, dispossession and alienation then it should be pretty clear that Europe is the best partner in fashioning responses to these threats, not least through the United Nations. The most neophyte of neo-conservatives should surely by now understand that America cannot think first of itself and only if strictly necessary of others. As President Kennedy once argued, 'The United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient… there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.'  

"It may be, as President Bush said in his State of the Union Address last year, that 'the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others.' But the course of America can certainly be helped and eased by the decisions and sympathy of others.  

"Most of what I have said, while critical of neo-conservative strategic thinking and concerned lest Europe should turn into a less successful if more vainglorious partner, assumes that behind the bitchiness and the frayed tempers of the last couple of years most of the fundamentals of a necessarily intense and comprehensive relationship are still in place. The only issue that gives me reason for any real doubt is the question of 'preventive' or 'pre-emptive' war which lies at the heart of the US National Security Strategy published in 2002. This does represent a clear break with American policy since President Truman who argued in his Memoirs, 'You don't "prevent" anything by war except peace.' It seems to me likely that at the very least the controversy surrounding the causes and pretexts of the invasion of Iraq, and in particular the doubts raised about the extent to which intelligence can prove mortal necessity rather than political choice, will encourage further debate about pre-emption and greater interest in maximising the legitimisation and credibility of the use of force to deal with possible threats. But to be sure that this happens, and that there is a sensible outcome, Europe will have to get its act together and do more than offer bromides and cop-outs about when armed force can be justified, and when the threat of force can support our wider aims.”

Press Contacts:

Anthony Gooch
202-862-9523
anthony.gooch@cec.eu.int

Maeve O'Beirne
202-862-9549
maeve.obeirne@cec.eu.int



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