Press Conference
Pascal Lamy
EU Trade Commissioner
European Commission
Delegation
Washington, DC
March 4, 2003
TRANSCRIPT
Commissioner Lamy:
A few words on this visit before I catch my plane in order to attend the
Commission meeting tomorrow morning in Brussels. The purpose of this visit
was, as usual, to check with the US administration and with Congress [on]
the state of play of
trade relations both bilaterally and multilaterally, plus [on] a number
of regional negotiations with third countries we have in common. And it’s,
as usual, checking with the main policy makers here what’s on our radar
screens and how we can move the trade agenda forward.
Of
course, this time it happens within a challenging international
environment—to use a diplomatic understatement—both because of the general
economic situation and because of a clearly difficult
geopolitical situation. I wanted to check whether my intention—which is
to try and send a clear message of how much we care about this transatlantic
trade relationship on this side—and whether a sort of EU policy we have in
this respect—which is to enhance the quality of the multilateral trade
system—and, given the Herculean responsibility that falls on the shoulders
of the two big elephants, of the system we share. Starting from this
consideration that we have a huge transatlantic trade and economic and
investment relationship and that it is an asset which we definitely need to
handle with great care.
The
main thing I will take back with me from these two days is that this view of
how we should handle things is shared on this side of the Atlantic, and this
is what I got from the meetings I had both with Zoellick, with Evans, with
Snow, with Friedman on the Administration side and with the meetings I had
on the Hill with Congress people and Senators.
I
think this translates into three main points:
- The first one is sort of a “non-contamination” principle.
We have to try and keep the transatlantic trade and economic relationship uncontaminated.
- The second—the first being a bit of a defensive—the second
is more on the offensive side. I think we agree that we should work more closely
together to push the multilateral agenda and to ensure that it meets and delivers
on the expectations of developing countries. That’s the sort of more offensive,
moving-forward agenda.
- And the third one is that on our bilateral disputes we need
to go on doing cleaning up, whether it’s on the
positive agenda—which we’ve launched at the
summit last year and which we will be sort of taking stock of next June with
the US/EU summit and
to move on the resolution of a number of bilateral disputes—whether these
disputes are already litigated; whether they are in course of litigation or
whether they are not yet litigated.
A few
points before I answer your questions:
- On the
Doha Development Agenda, of course, we spent quite a lot of time on
agriculture. I told my interlocutors that we have moved on this issue because
we need others to move too on this issue. And, particularly, our US friends who
spend as much as we do on agricultural support and if we are to agree to further
disciplines in Europe—which we are ready to do—we need the US to go in the same
direction. We also need, both of us, to work harder on how we can make the agricultural
part of the Round sort of more development-friendly—development being one of the
priorities of this Round. And I have reminded my interlocutors that Europe is
not only on the defensive agriculturally, we are also on the defensive notably
on geographical indications (GIs), which is for our side a strong label to use
it in these particular circumstances—a strong label for quality—and that if the
European agricultural system is to move from less quantity and more quality in
terms of farming means, GI’s are obviously of extreme importance.
- On industrial goods, we have a pretty similar agenda. We
both are very ambitious and we both are of the view that developing countries’
concerns exist, even [if] in the way we can address them we’ve not yet sorted
out bilaterally with the US.
- Same in services, where we both believe that services can
now play an important role in terms of matching a number of development concerns.
And if one wants to be convinced about this, just have a close look at the requests
we get on both sides from a number of important developing countries.
- On the rules side of the agenda, I have re-explained and
we’ve re-discussed the Singapore issue: investment, competition, trade facilitation
plus, of course, the trade defense disciplines. And the view is progressing that
addressing these issues is crucial if we really want to translate market access
opportunities—trade opening in theory into real trade flows—hence contributing
to increasing growth of jobs and reduction of poverty in many parts of this planet.
- On the bilateral side and notably the disputes which, of
course, the media are much more interested with than the positives—we know that’s
life—on this my message was pretty clear, and I had sort of made it clear here
before I arrived—thanks to some of you. Cases are starting to pile up, and we
need to seek compliance. And I don’t want a situation where, you know, we would
have a sort of piling up/log jam of non-resolved issues after they have been litigated
and notably because Congress would not move forward. My basic point with the Hill
has been that it’s in the interest of the US to comply. The US is a key pillar
of the WTO (World Trade Organization) systems. Disciplines of the WTO, including
the dispute settlement machinery, are for the advantage and for the benefit of
the US economy. And that’s apart from the piece we see, which is where the disputes
of the machinery is actioned by either of us or third countries. There is a whole
bunch of issues which does not appear. [They] are things which we sort of pre-comply
within our own domestic decision machineries because of the existence of this
dispute settlement machinery which, of course, is very important. And we know
that all disciplines are important when they are not actioned.
- I heard in my meetings with Congress this morning that some
movement is to be expected shortly on cases which we care about:
1916 Irish Music Act. I think this movement in the right direction, if confirmed,
is good news and we, of course, will be following this closely in terms of the
wording of these pieces of legislation to make sure that it really addresses the
compliance problem. On
Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs), I also had quite a lot of discussions in
order to see when and how the [inaudible] of legislation—which I think the intention
of which—now in the system will move forward, in order to adjust my own system
of leveraging compliance, either by persuasion, by discussion or by other means
if other means of compliance become necessary at some stage in order to focus
minds and create a sort of sense that this has to be done. That’s where we are
and I am now, after this summing up, ready to answer questions from your side.
Washington Trade Daily:
[Inaudible] a number of disputes/problems/initiatives with the United
States. After your trip here, can you tell us something in terms of what has
moved forward [inaudible] Irish Music 1916 [whether Lamy sees progress
toward compliance in other cases that are piling up]?
Commissioner Lamy:
Yes, I mean, that’s true; and if I sort of have to come back next week for
two more, I’ll do it. And as we probably have eight of them on the list
presently, it can be sorted out in a month. And fine, I’m even ready to
spend a few weekends here if that’s necessary. I think and the sense is
that, as I said, at the end of the day, doing this is caring for a system
which is good for the US economy, for the US industry and that the sort of
increasing record of compliance is medium-term—what we all should do, and
especially those of us who have a big trade [inaudible] with the rest of the
world. I haven’t looked at this or into the details of that yet, but I think
I will come back to Brussels with some sense that, yes, these things are
being addressed.
Journalist [inaudible]:
Could you just elaborate on
that? When you say you haven’t looked at the details of…which one?
Commissioner Lamy:
The repeal of the 1916 legislation and the exact terms of the appropriations
for the Irish Music compensation.
Journalist [inaudible]:
Switching topics just a
little bit to the FSC: you met with Chairman Thomas, and I was wondering if
he gave you at all any sense of timeline and any sense of outline of what
he’s doing and if it sounded reasonable to you, or do you think it may end
up being another law that would be unacceptable to the World Trade’s rules?
Commissioner Lamy:
The sense I got from
Chairman Thomas is the same I got at the end of last year. He is committed
to solving this. The piece of legislation which he tabled at the end of last
year met with WTO requirements in terms of repealing the export subsidy
content of FSC/ETI, and that’s my only purpose. I, frankly speaking, don’t
want to spend a lot of time on the US
tax problem. It’s not my problem. It’s a problem for US legislators, for US
sovereignty, for US corporations, for your tax payers and for your citizens.
My only intrusion in this system is when there is an export subsidy. There
is an export subsidy, and we’ve got to get rid of this. And I repeat, the
PEC table at the end of last year—after what the President of the US said,
after what the Administration said—was fine in terms of its compliance with
the WTO ruling. Now we all know that the thing has to restart because there
is a new Congress. And we will be watching this very carefully but, I mean,
his determination seems unabated.
Hill newspaper:
I have a tabled list of the products that make up the $4 billion in tariffs
that you could put on US goods and services. I’m wondering—if there will
come a time when you will do that—how you will determine which products the
tariffs will be placed on and whether you’ll place them on the products in a
way to leverage political advantage by targeting, say, products in states
that are important to the presidential election or targeting companies in
order to get the administration to sign on to the
Kyoto agreement?
Commissioner Lamy:
The $4 billion dollar list—4-billion-dollar question—is presently being
addressed within the European Union. We have a whole machinery of internal
consultations, a bit like what you have here. And, when you table a list
like this, you’ve got to consult thoroughly with industry, with member
states, with the
European Parliament and that’s being done. I have last week tabled a
list which is now being looked at by my authorizing environment. And, once
we have finished the consultations on this, we will then move to the next
step, which is—with this list agreed, which will be then the EU list—go to
WTO arbitration for clearance, which shouldn’t be a problem given what the
procedure is about. And then the list will be ready, ready to use if
necessary, which I hope won’t be necessary. The way we’ve devised it, of
course, we’ve tried to put together a clever list and not a stupid list.
What’s a clever list? A clever list is a list which leverages as much as
possible compliance on this [US] side without hurting EU interests on the
other side. We know that putting tariffs is not that intelligent, in terms
of enhancing trade flows. And, if we have one day to put tariffs, we will do
it cleverly.
Targeting is not the name of the game, even if the experience of the past
has shown that a list like this gets more attention if, here and there,
people care about it. I mean, when the US
put French Roquefort on the list previously, it probably wasn’t because of
the extreme importance of French Roquefort for the US
economy. I am not aware of that. When the US
started targeting Shetland, which is not a French product but a European
product from somewhere else in Europe, it probably was not because of the
vast herds of sheep in the US who produce extremely good quality Shetland
wool. So, I mean, that’s the rule of the game; and I don’t even want to go
back to the chicken or pasta war of the past. So there is nothing new in
that. We all try to be clever. We sometimes are clever, sometimes not
clever; but trying to be clever is something we all are entitled to do.
Whether it has anything to do with the Kyoto Protocol, obviously the answer
is, no. The European Union is not enough of a hard power to make this sort
of linkage. And even if we were more of a hard power, which I personally
wish, I am not sure we would do it because I don’t think it’s good for [the]
understanding of these issues by the citizens. The US pulled out from the
Kyoto Protocol. It’s a solemn decision by the US. We regret it. We think
that, medium- and long-term, it’s not good news; but we are not going to use
trade sanctions or trade restrictions to push the US into a compliance which
they are, vis-à-vis international law, entirely legally founded not to step
in. So that’s not the way we work.
Journalist [inaudible]:
How far do you see the
March 31 agricultural deadline, in terms of the overall success of the
[inaudible] negotiations, and how important [inaudible] the concessions by
the major trading partners—the US and the EU—on anti-dumping as to the
overall success of the negotiations?
Commissioner Lamy:
We have a deadline for modalities in agriculture for the 31st of
March, as by the way we have a number of other deadlines on other issues.
And it all depends, and I reckon it’s a terribly technical topic, [on] what
you call modalities. We also have a deadline for Cancun on modalities on
separations, for instance. We have a deadline in springtime for agreeing on
modalities on industrial tariffs. So, [the issue of] modalities is starting
from a program of negotiation. Modalities is a step you need to do in order
to frame the negotiations so that big blocks of it and sort of a range of
numbers, which we are looking for, is there—is a basic consensus on that.
And, of course, in agriculture we already have a sort of a pre-framing in
the negotiation we agreed in Doha: reduction of trade distorting domestic support, reduction
of export subsidies, increasing market access. And the question is, Now how
can we sort of make this more precise without, of course, stepping into the
third phase, which is the fine tuning of this? And we all know that the fine
tuning of this will happen on the last day of the negotiation—as will the
fine tuning of each and every of the thirty topics which is on the table
agriculturally, one; and there probably are 29 others. So, I mean, the
secret of moving this negotiation forward is whether or not on the 31st
March we can agree on this. I hope we can do it. I believe we can do it.
It’s not a question of whether we have these topics within the agricultural
negotiation and with constituencies around the WTO table who have obviously
sort of dissimilar interests in certain priorities. Some are more interested
in market access because they want to export; some are more interested in
support reduction because they believe it creates a competitive advantage
for them. So I mean US/EU hardliners [inaudible] and [inaudible] important
countries in Africa
or Asia may not have the same view of where the priorities are. And, of
course, a step about modalities would be good news for the remaining part of
the negotiations which are to take place. And it’s about concessions. And
this is why the EU has tabled a paper in which we concede already at this
stage of the negotiation quite a lot of our negotiating credit. I mean, if
we agree that the ceilings which we had for the Uruguay Round are lowered by
50%, it is a concession. If we agree that we are ready to eliminate export
subsidies in some areas which are of significance for the European
countries, it’s a concession. We never agreed to elimination in possibly
anywhere in the past 40 years. So we already have made concessions, and we
wish others to do the same. Anti-dumping which is part of this program of
negotiation is a defensive for the US,
is a defensive for a number of other countries and is an important topic for
the European Union in terms of the ability of the WTO system to increase
disciplines. We don’t have a problem on this. Our internal rules for
managing trade difference instruments are sort of WTO-plus-plus already. So
we have no problem in WTO moving to a WTO-plus system. And I think, before
the WTO rules on anti-dumping oblige us to change ours, we probably have one
or two rounds ahead of us. So, it’s an important issue. I think we’ve tried
to help the US side to move on this because it’s a difficult domestic topic.
And we understand that because, the way the US system works, I think the US
Administration has been doing this rather cleverly at present: notably in
trying to explain that this view—that a minimum of disciplines was playing
in the interest of the US traditionally—has changed; and that, given the
recourse to anti-dumping and trade defense instruments by many developing
countries, the game is switching; and that the objective interest in the US
in the system needs to have more disciplines. And I think it’s true. And
it’s a clever view and, by the way, this is why we also have an interest in
this. So, it’s progressing. It’s ripening nicely. And I don’t think it’s a
topic where we should go back to the sort of nice tactical blame game which
we have all played at some part of this negotiation. It’s an important
potential resolve of this negotiation. And we have to care about this in
handing it as much as possible, nor to deal with the US, who will have to
deliver at the end of the day.
Washington Tariff and Trade Letter:
Any reason, once the United
States has stepped up its negotiations in bilateral free trade agreements
around the world—and Mr. Zoellick has claimed this is an effort to free up
the competition for market opening but in some ways it’s also intended, I
think, to isolate the European Union in world negotiations. Do you see these
bilateral free trade agreements that the US is entering as something that is
helpful to the trading system with the WTO and, in particular, to the EU/US
relationship or something that is detrimental?
Commissioner Lamy:
Yes, I mean, they call it competitive liberalization here and I don’t share
the view that this would be something which would isolate the European
Union. I mean if the US want a free trade area with Morocco, whose trade is
5% with the US and 65% with Europe, I don’t feel this is a threat. If the US are having [inaudible] on the FTAA negotiation, we don’t see
that as a threat. I mean, we’ve embarked on negotiations [inaudible], which
we’ve concluded and which we’ve ratified. We’ve embarked on a negotiation
with
Mercosur. We might do things in the future with the
Central American Community; with the
Andean Community. I don’t see that as competition. It may be—and after
all, that’s good for them—it may be an opportunity for these countries to
try and raise the price of an agreement in telling the US, Well, that’s what
we could do with the EU, or telling us, That’s what we could do with the US.
[I’m] fine with that. It’s something which is in their hands. It’s the rule
of the game and, after all, if they can sort of leverage the two elephants’
presence [to] their advantage, fine.
Are
these helpful for the Round? I mean, we remain of the view that the
multilateral trade rules is the best option in town because it is the
area—the domain—where the output-versus-input-productivity ratio is the
best. With some political energy—and we all know that we need domestic
political energy to agree to trade agreements—we get a lot of what we all
need because it’s around and because we can sort of pick [a] negotiating
partner, which we have in Geneva. I acknowledge that bilateral free trade
agreements are, in a way, domestically or politically more sexy—and this is
probably why it’s also sort of a good teasing to start some of these. We
have a lot of them, and our philosophy is: WTO first. And if we can have
WTO-plus agreements, yes, as a second option—and in a number of areas we
have this option. I mean, to my remembrance, the only negotiation which [on]
our side was motivated by the sort of competitive problem was
Mexico, which we did after NAFTA and which we finished at the beginning
of the year 2000. Yes, on this one, we did a free trade agreement because we
had a concern that, with the NAFTA, the European Union market share in
Mexico and the trade with Mexico could be sort of sidelined. It’s the only
one I have in mind which corresponds to this category. The rest of our free
trade agreements are basically with countries that trade with us half of
their trade. That’s if you look at the
Mediterranean basin,
ex-Eastern and Central Europe—now Ukraine or Russia, or even Mercosur or
South Africa. That’s the rationale behind this.
Kiplinger Letter:
How crucial do you see the
issue of geographical place names for foods as being to the agricultural
negotiations of the Doha Round?
Commissioner Lamy:
Well, I think I mentioned
that in my opening remarks: it is crucial. It is crucial because that’s one
of the sort of nice prices we can get for European farmers in a sort of
niche sector where geographical indications are sort of a factor of added
value, of higher margins, of sort of better quality. And that’s the way we
want to move forward. It’s true for wines and spirits; and we have an
agreement in the WTO that this register should be set up this year. It’s
also true for the extension of this list, which is a sort of soft trademark
protection. It’s not a trademark. It’s a [inaudible] specialist. There’s
quite a bit of a difference between [a] geographical indication and [a]
trademark, not the least, for instance, because you can’t trade a
geographical indication, whereas you can trade a trademark. But, I mean, I’m
not entering into details. So, it’s very important for us. As time comes and
as the pre-negotiation about this happens, we realize that a number of
developing countries are also very much interested in this and that the
connection with intellectual property and traditional names is extremely
important. India
knows what Basmati rice is about. Even the developed countries like Japan
know what Kobe beef is about. So it’s nicely spreading. But, to answer your
question: yes, it is very important for us in terms of balancing our
agricultural constituencies’ interests.
National Journalists’ Congress Daily:
What do you make of the
fact that all the trade negotiators criticize the
Harbinson paper more than they emphasize the possible commonalities of
that? Was everybody sort of thinking this whole thing wasn’t going very
well? Or what does that mean? And, secondly, what do you think the
prospects are now for the meeting in Cancun? What level of progress can be
made there?
Commissioner Lamy:
On the Harbinson paper: Stu
Harbinson said in Tokyo that this paper, he tabled it to trigger a debate.
Well, he did trigger a debate. And, as always…a multi-text of this kind is
shot at by everybody. And, given the way it was drafted, it’s been shot at
by everybody because nobody wants, as far as I understand, even to go on
saying, Well, it’s something we could live with but not that… And I think
that [the] sort of basic explanation behind this lies in the fact that it’s
too detailed for this state of the negotiation. There are good things in
this paper. But the way he sort of [inaudible] a number of numbers I think
is not helpful. And this is why we need to work extremely hard to get
something which is acceptable to everybody on the [inaudible]. Here again,
I’m coming back to what I said: modalities is not the end of the
negotiation. In each of these negotiations, it’s a sort of ripening process,
except that it’s not ripening nicely day after day with the sun. It’s a
ripening process, but it may not ripen during months and [then] ripen in two
days. That’s the virtue of spasms. And the ones who know about how it works
know that the best negotiator in this world is the guy or the girl who will
know whether a spasm is good or not; and we are all researching this
[inaudible].
On the
Cancun prospects: directly with what I was just saying, it’s not because Cancun will happen two-third of the way that Cancun will result in
two-thirds of the agreement. That’s not the way it works. What we will have
to assess in Cancun is whether or not the view we have that the deadline at
the end of 2004, which we have agreed in Doha, is reachable or not. And
then, depending on that, if the answer to that is, yes, well we will have a
rough year with a sort of clearly-agreed timeframe. And this will help focus
energies and prepare for [inaudible] promises, notably in sort of domestic
asymmetry. If it’s not available or if reach the conclusion we can’t get
there, then we’ll have to sort of adopt another scenario. My own sense is
that we can get there; that, as compared to the previous rounds—and I quite
well remember from the way the Uruguay Round was handled: the degree of
commitment, the degree of discussion, the sort of inevitable abrasive
tactical part of a negotiation like this. We are moving to the sort of “get
real” part of the negotiation on this complex agenda. So, that’s my present
expectation for Cancun. But, of course, lots of things have to happen in
between.
Associated Press:
In your discussions
yesterday with the Congressional leaders, did you get any assurances on when
legislation might be passed in the House and Senate, and did your
discussions include Democrats who seem to be very critical of the comments
[inaudible]?
Commissioner Lamy:
Well, of course, it
included Democrats, but I won’t enter into domestic politics on this side of
the Atlantic. We already have within Europe a tradition in the Commission
that we are relatively neutral, if we want to do our business well. So, even
on this side, I won’t comment on that. On the “when” question: of course I
raised it, and I got sort of answers which are not that precise. And I will
[be] moving at some stage at the “when” question, but I will do that when my
judgment is that the “when” question is right. I don’t think it is right
today. But I know that, in the times to come, the “when” question will have
to be there—either if, on this side there is a deadline which stems from the
legislative work—and then I’ll have to make a judgment whether or not this
fits with my own time horizon or if there is no sort of deadline of this
kind, whether it’s useful or not for me to put one. So, it’s still a hanging
question, but we all have it in mind.
Reuters: Some
lawmakers, because of their frustration with the situation of the Security
Council in [relation] to Iraq, have talked about perhaps warning labels on
French wine and water to alert consumers to the fact that they might be
hazardous to their health. Would there be a justification for the Unites
States to take such an action? And, if it did, how would you respond? And
then, secondly, I think that one thing that kind of rankles some lawmakers
and business groups on FSC is the fact that the United States has an $82
billion trade deficit with the European Union. So I guess it would
[inaudible] FSC if we had an $86 billion trade deficit with the European
Union. Does the fact that the US has such a large trade deficit with the
European Union concern Europe at all? Does Europe feel as though it should be doing more to get its economy
growing, so perhaps those figures could see some improvement on this side?
Commissioner Lamy:
On the first one, I’m not
an expert in what-ifisms, so I don’t answer questions about “what if?” I
read the papers. I haven’t been contacted by any Congressman, whichever rank
she or he would have, which would sort of consult me or the EU website on
whether this would be EU- or WTO-compliant; and I hope it won’t happen. On
the trade deficit question: we trade negotiators do not run our systems with
trade deficit radar, sort of piloting our [inaudible]. It’s an important
number. We all have to care for the fact that such balances do not spread to
sort of currency situations or others, but we don’t handle these numbers. We
handle parameters, which are some of those which result in these numbers. So
it’s not a trade problem. It’s an economic problem. And it is true that this
trade deficit, which is huge and which is permanent now, is either—and I’m
not an enough of an expert—a permanent feature of the world economy. And,
really, we’ve entered a stage where the US will have a $500 billion deficit
permanently, which is a system [that] is matched with the fact that the $500
billion financing that needs to be there is there in the system. It’s not
what I wrote in my books, but we may have to sort of look at the books from
time to time. So maybe that’s the case. But my own sense is that it has to
do with a gross differential, which undoubtedly exists between the US and
the rest of the world, by the way. Not so much with Europe as with Japan, for instance. And
this is a macro-economic problem, which I think we need to address. I’m
afraid I can’t help a lot for Japan,
but we can help for Europe. And this is what we in the Commission are trying
to do with the
Lisbon agenda, the basic target of which is how we can raise our
potential growth rate by 1%. What sort of reforms do we have to do to match
this? And this is something which we are on, and I discussed this yesterday
with Secretary Snow. Yes, it’s a bit problem, and we have to handle it. But
it’s more on the sort of macro-economic policy than on the trade side.
Tax
Analyst: Mr.
Commissioner, during many of your Washington meetings, did you discuss the possibility of a WTO challenge
by the United States
against the European Union
e-commerce value added tax directive?
Commissioner
Lamy: No.
Bloomberg:
Yesterday, at your press conference with Ambassador Zoellick, you mentioned
that you are proceeding with a lot of care because of the geopolitical
situation. To what extent [are] the differences over a possible war in Iraq
interfering with US compliance on FSC?
Commissioner Lamy:
As I said in my opening
remarks, my sort of guiding concept is [one of] non-contamination. So I will
try—we will try—to make sure that this enormous asset we all care about is
not hit by these turbulences. And I want as much as possible to disconnect a
sort of abrasiveness on this, not least because I’m speaking on this in the
name of Europe. And it’s one area where Europe has got its act together.
Thanks God, by the way! And, I mean, I would not like and should not, as a
Commissioner, interfere with sectors where Europe doesn’t get its act
together. I have no authority to make any sort of linkage of this kind and I
don’t want this to happen. So: precaution, care and non-contamination.
Journalist [inaudible]:
I also come back to this
wine question. [inaudible] the impact of this growing anti-European feeling
[inaudible]. What’s going to happen to France [inaudible]?
Commissioner Lamy:
As I said in the beginning,
it’s something I’m looking at carefully. No numbers are available that would
show any impact. On the
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), which is one of the sort of
transatlantic dialogues which were set up a few years ago (with the
transatlantic consumer dialogue, the
transatlantic legislators’ dialogue, the
transatlantic environment dialogue and the
transatlantic labor dialogue, which is a set up of businesses and EU/US
EU Commissioner/US Administration representatives), the rules again being
that EU and US businesses come to joint positions, express priorities and we
have to sort of answer to their questions or their priority list. It’s
worked all right for a few years. Obviously, we have a sort of fatigue
problem which translates in a lower attendance of big shots to these
manifestations. It started before
9/11. It started before 15/3.
American Metal Market:
On the surface, Congress
has expressed a lot of opposition to the idea of repealing the Continued
Dumping & Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment). I was wondering if your meetings on the Hill helped to
dispel or reinforce that perception. And, secondly, have Administration
officials indicated in any way their priority on this?
Commissioner Lamy:
On this non-contamination:
yes, there may be a danger, and we trade people have to sort of provide as
much as we can [in the way of] insurance policy for businesses, for people
who trade, for markets. We have to provide stability. We have to provide
transparency. We have to provide predictability. And [whenever] the degree
of risk in the system increases, we are paid to step in and say, Well, what
can we do to sterilize it? So of course I am watching this very carefully at
this stage. As I said, I have [seen] no sign of contamination, but this not
a reason for not being careful.
On
GM (genetically-modified) food, of course, we discussed that as we do
permanently. And I think there is a distinction to be made here between two
topics. The first one is what sort of rules do we set in Europe to address the question of how we authorize GM food, GM
feed, GM seed? And this is an issue which we are dealing with. We obviously
don’t have the same system as the system the US has. We have an
authorization system, which is more precautionary. And this can perfectly be
done within the margin of maneuver which WTO rules leave to each and every
member in terms of consideration of health levels for instance. And if the
US have a problem with that, we can discuss it. By the way, we did discuss
it. For instance, in recent legislation about traceability and labeling, and
we can try and address a number of concerns the US
have. And, once we’ve adopted our legislation, the US
always have the possibility to litigate in WTO if they want to. We would win
a case like this because WTO provisions provide for the necessary margin of
maneuver and because our legislation has been tailored so that it is
proportional, transparent, scientific advice on which we found our
decisions, which is available to anybody. So we don’t have a problem with
that.
Now
there is another question, which is whether or not the said rules we’ve
decided for ourselves we run it or not. And that’s the problem with the
so-called moratorium. It happens that the authorization process which we
used to have and we still have involves our member states—[as on] this side
of the Atlantic, when the executive branch needs an involvement of a
legislator to do something. What happened was that our legislator, our
member states, said at some stage, Well, we [will] go on strike. We [will]
stop participating in this authorization machinery until you do this. And,
as it happens also on this side of the Atlantic, well, we had to do it.
Because, at the end of the day, they make the decisions. And we did it. And
now we’ve done it, we [will] resume the authorization process. And we know
that a number of our member states could be of the view that maybe we should
do something else before we resume the authorization process. And on this we
disagree. This is a Commission position. Both my colleague
David Byrne, my colleague
Franz Fischler, my colleague
Margot Wallström have joined a unanimous line on this. And this is why
we are in the process of resuming this. And if we didn’t resume this, of
course the US would have a point. The US would have a point because it’s one
thing having a different judgment on whether our system is WTO-compliant or
not, and it’s another thing that we have a system and we don’t implement it.
It’s a much easier case and in terms of WTO: the first one is based on
health reduction; the second one, if we don’t implement our own rules, then
in, WTO terms, the suspicion may be that it’s for protectionist reasons. It
is not for protectionist reasons we do this. I mean, all of you who’ve
stepped once in Europe know that our farming communities are not that
excited [about] GMO [one way] or the other. It’s consumers. It’s
environmentalists. It’s academics. It’s [the] scientific [community] who are
concerned about this. So, on this one, the US may have a point. And this is
why we are trying to handle this in taking our own responsibilities as
executive.
On the
Byrd Amendment: you know that it’s been ruled WTO-non-compliant for obvious
reasons. By the way, it’s not only a EU-US problem. We’re not the only ones
to litigate on this, like basically on most of the
steel things, and Byrd has a lot to do with steel. We are still in the
part of the aftermath of the WTO decision, which is dealing with a
reasonable period for compliance. I’ve seen that a number of Senators have
signed a letter that they will repeal it. They will have to repeal it at
some stage.
