European Union Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities and the Emerging European Union Security Strategy

EU Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities and the Emerging EU Security Strategy

Address by

Ambassador Dr. Guenter Burghardt
Head of Delegation
Delegation of the European Commission to the United States

To the Conference on “The European Union: Its Role and Power in the Emerging International System”
The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Robertson Hall, Princeton University, October 3-5, 2003

Co-sponsored by the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-determination (LISD), Program on European Politics and Society (EPS), Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies (PIIRS) and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

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Introduction

It is a great pleasure to be with you today, as the first half of an EU tag team effort with my good friend Wolfgang Ischinger, the Ambassador of Germany to the United States, who will address our dinner this evening. I wish to thank organizers Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and Ezra Suleiman, and the participating units of Princeton University, for assembling this impressive gathering of experts on the European Union. Such a transatlantic meeting of the minds at one of the world’s best universities should indeed bring more attention to the EU’s expanding international role.

One of Princeton’s most beautiful minds, Albert Einstein, a true citizen of the old Europe and of the new world, had this to say about his adopted home: “I am privileged by fate to live here in Princeton as if on an island. Into this small university town the chaotic voices of human strife barely penetrate.” [March 20, 1936; Einstein Archive 32 – 387]

Today, in the era of globalization, Princeton still enjoys some of the academic tranquility which makes it such a wonderful place to reflect about the very serious issue of our conference, which is no more and no less than about how to reestablish trust into the transatlantic relationship. This is a welcome change from what can sometimes seem a playground for shouting matches of stereotypes and caricatures.

Einstein described America as a child of Europe; not as a country but as a continent; and American people not as a nation, but as the result of “continuous immigration which has not yet come to an end.” This is what makes me optimistic about the indispensable partnership between the United States and the European Union, strategically the most important relationship in the world. It is a relationship between the result of mainly European immigration, which has so successfully helped to invent the United States, and Europeans about to unite the old continent into the new Europe. Let me be so courageous as to suggest that we have not undergone any dramatic genetic modification over the past 230 years of separate developments.

I have been asked to focus my remarks on EU civilian crisis management capabilities. In reviewing the program, however, I noticed that I am sandwiched between two expert panels dealing with exactly that topic. So it seems wise to offer only an appetizer between those meatier discussions.

Given the broad scope of this conference, I thought it would be more helpful to place civilian crisis management in the broader context of the developing European security strategy and to compare the European security approach to that of the United States, particularly as set out in President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy. This is an ambitious agenda, given the 15 minute time limit suggested by our hosts: a crisis in itself which I hope to manage successfully, but which will oblige me to present only general introductory remarks.

The EU’s Expanding Capacity as a Global Actor

This conference represents a positive indication that the EU is increasing its capacities as an international actor, and as a global partner to the US, at a time when the speed and impact of globalization is accelerating. Indeed, the EU possesses an impressive range of tools in addressing global and regional security challenges. Here it is important to underline that defense and military issues, however important, are for the EU collectively still a slowly emerging dimension – after the failure of the European Defense Community almost 50 years ago – of any “Security Strategy” worthy of the name. Using that broad definition, which I believe more accurately reflects the world we live in, the EU’s contributions include:

External development assistance: with its member states, the EU is responsible for some 55% of all such assistance and some 66% of grant assistance. This is a vital contribution to security given the serious security implications of poverty and inequality, beyond the moral imperatives they raise.

Support of global trade: The EU played a central role in the creation and development of the World Trade Organization, and we have actively promoted the Doha Development Round. Cancun was disappointing to all who participated, but we are committed to addressing the concerns of developing countries and completing the Round.

Bolstering effective multilateralism: The EU contributes to international security through its support of multilateral organizations and agreements, with the United Nations at the top of the list. Here I am thinking of the UN disarmament and non-proliferation conventions, environmental treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change and the International Criminal Court.

Responding to Regional Crises

Over the past decade, the EU has substantially increased its international capabilities as the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defense Policy have taken shape. The Security and Defense Policy also features the military and civilian “headline goal” of establishing a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troops capable of being deployed within 60 days for up to a year and of deploying up to 5,000 police officers for international missions of conflict prevention and crisis management, 1,000 of whom can be deployed within 30 days. This trend in the enhancement of the EU’s capabilities was further accelerated following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, with the EU responding with greater speed and engaging with the US on a common agenda to combat terrorism and strengthen homeland security. The adoption of the European Arrest Warrant and then the signature, on the margins of the 25 June 2003 EU-US Summit, of the Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Agreement are examples of that endeavor.

Though the CFSP and ESDP are still taking form, civilian crisis management has long been an important element of the EU’s external capabilities. We have gained experience and expertise while playing a significant role in Kosovo, Macedonia, many regional disputes in Africa and the Middle East. With the headline goals, the EU now has the capacity for stand-alone operations involving either military troops or civilian police, and for contributions to those operations under the UN umbrella.

In 2003, the EU’s first ever military and policing operations include:

1. The ongoing EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deploying a civilian police force of 500, following on from the UN's International Police Task Force;

2. The ongoing “Operation Concordia” in Macedonia, deploying 350 military troops in contributing to a stable and secure environment to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement; and

3. The just completed “Operation Artemis” in the Bunia region of the Democratic Republic of Congo, conducted under the UN umbrella to provide an interim emergency multinational force. The 1,400-strong multinational EU military force, forming the bulk of a total UN force commitment of 2,000, was led by France.

4. The civilian policing mission “Operation Proxima,” agreed by EU foreign ministers earlier this week, will begin in December 2003 and consist of a policing deployment of 200 to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Proxima will dovetail with the end of Operation Concordia, providing support and advice to Macedonian police.

5. The EU has also offered to provide a peacekeeping mission to assume responsibilities in Bosnia from NATO by the middle of next year. While this proposal is still being considered by NATO, it underlines the EU’s commitment to developing a credible military capability.

The EU has also placed considerable emphasis on preventing regional crises. This is an area where the Commission has played a key role, particularly as the EU’s conflict prevention tools are found in many areas where it has direct responsibility, including development co-operation and external assistance, trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies and co-operation with international partners and NGOs. To coordinate our response better, the Commission has established an early warning and rapid reaction system, systematizing information received from our Delegations around the world to create a “Country Conflict Assessment” for more than 120 countries. A watch list of the most critical countries or regions is then closely monitored by the Commission, in cooperation with the Council. I must confess that I do not know if California is currently on the Commission’s watch list.

More seriously, a good example of effective use of the watch list is the period following the assassinations and heightening of the rebel insurgency in Nepal. A thorough conflict assessment was carried out by the Commission, resulting in the creation of support programs for at-risk populations and modification of mainstream EU development programming to better meet the situation on the ground. Other examples of efforts to prevent or respond to crisis situations include Kosovo, the Southern Caucuses and now also Afghanistan, where with our American partners the EU is a major contributor of humanitarian aid and reconstruction assistance.

In the case of Iraq, the EU is playing a key role in organizing the 23-24 October donors conference to be held in Madrid, with the Commission coordinating much of that effort. The Commission has also issued a Communication which outlines three factors key to the success of the reconstruction effort:

An improvement in the security situation; A clear commitment to the establishment of a sovereign Iraqi government; andThe creation of a transparent and operational multilateral framework for reconstruction.

In releasing the Communication, EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten noted that: “Whatever the depth of division in the international community over the war, we all have a stake in a stable, open, democratic Iraq. In Madrid, Europe will play its part to lay the first foundations for bringing about a better life for the Iraqis under their own representative government.”

An EU Security Strategy

Against this general background, in June 2003 Javier Solana submitted his recommendations for “A Secure Europe in a Better World” to the European Council. This will be the basis for a more comprehensive paper outlining the EU’s Security Strategy, to be adopted by the European Council in December. Many other contributions have and will be made to this debate in the run-up to that meeting.

The Solana paper acknowledges the changing international environment and the “new threats” of the post-cold war era. Like the US, the EU is particularly concerned with the possibility of a lethal triple-threat combination of international terrorism, failed states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To combat these and other threats, Javier Solana suggests three fundamental strategic objectives for the EU’s Security Strategy:

promoting stability and good governance in the EU’s own neighborhood;

more responsive international order based on effective multilateralism;

tackling both the new and old threats

The EU’s impact in its own neighborhood is perhaps the most overlooked aspect of EU security policy, and it is based in the EU’s own development. The inception and evolution of European integration has made an unprecedented contribution to European security, more than fulfilling the investment of US assistance via the Marshall Plan. The EU’s enlargement process has now extended that stability, after the EU’s own investment of the equivalent of two Marshall plans in Central Europe, paying additional dividends to the US in the form of an increasingly capable global partner. Under the “Wider Europe” initiative, the EU’s contribution to stability also extends to our “new neighbors,” offering the prospect of eventual membership to Southeastern Europe, reinforcing our ties with Russia, Ukraine and the other NIS and furthering the Barcelona process which engages our Middle Eastern and North African neighbors along the Mediterranean basin. The result of the European Union process, together with the EU’s neighborhood policy, is of direct benefit to the United States. Instead of having to maintain order in the “old” Europe of fully sovereign Nation States, at great cost, the US now enjoys the windfall of stability and prosperity generated by the “new” Europe of nation states sharing sovereignty through common institutions, almost for free.

The second fundamental objective, enhanced multilateralism, is at the core of the EU’s own identity and development as a federation of nation states. Though in some ways it is sui generis, the EU is perhaps the best evidence that multilateralism works. Much work remains to be done, but we have achieved much more than the EU founders would have thought possible. I would follow Churchill in arguing that the EU method of enhanced multilateralism is the worst approach to international relations except for all the others that have been tried. At the international level, the heart of such an approach must be a strong United Nations.

Historically, this perspective has been actively supported by the US, but that view seems no longer based on a consensus. Contrary to some interpretations, it should not be interpreted as a complacent approach to addressing international problems. Kagan [Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order, New York: Knopf, 2003] has famously asserted that Americans live on practical and action oriented Mars, while Europeans inhabit contemplative and effete Venus, which he characterizes as a kind of hermetically sealed “postmodern paradise.” I must strongly disagree—that would truly be a fool’s paradise. Just look at a map and you will see that the EU has no choice but to engage many other countries. We are also at the center of many of the trends that define globalization. We know as well as anyone that, if international organizations are to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, we must be ready to act when their rules are broken.

If necessary, as in the Balkans, such a response must involve the credible threat and ultimate use of force. To be legitimate, the EU approach requires that force be based on international consent. We also realize, however, that the EU’s own credibility in those situations is judged in part on the further development of our own defense capabilities, which I have already described. The 25 EU member states have a yearly defense budget of 160 billion euro, which should not be discounted, but those resources must be used in the most efficient manner possible.

The third fundamental objective is to meet both old and new security threats more efficiently, again encapsulating many of the examples I have already provided. Here Javier Solana argues that the EU must be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives, noting that: “We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention…particularly of operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.” The draft Treaty produced by the EU’s constitutional convention, the starting point for the Intergovernmental Conference being launched today in Rome, also suggests a number of constructive innovations in the EU’s foreign policy process.

The US and EU Security Strategies: Our Similarities May Surprise You

In concluding, allow me to compare briefly the emerging EU Security Strategy with that of the United States, as set out in the 2002 US National Security Strategy paper. It is no secret that many Europeans were concerned by a number of elements of the US strategy, and in particular the “3 Ps” – prevention, pre-eminence, pre-emption – that have arguably been at the core of much of the Bush Administration’s foreign policy following the 11 September terrorist attacks. You are no doubt aware of the concern expressed by many legal scholars that pre-emption threatens to overturn centuries of international law.

Indeed, much European reaction to the 3 Ps can be summarized by a fourth – polarization. Given the anxiety caused by the current Administration’s first year in office, when one international agreement after another was reconsidered or abandoned, and despite the solidarity and enormous sympathy that followed the 11 September attacks, recent opinion polling shows that Europeans are increasingly disenchanted with US policies, particularly in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. That is a great pity. We must move beyond such polarization and find our way back to a fifth P – partnership – to take advantage of the enormous resources the US and the EU have to offer as global partners. This also harkens to the three Ps of the European Union’s founding fathers: peace, prosperity and a new partnership offered by a united Europe as an international actor.

It is clear that we currently disagree on fundamental aspects of our approaches to securing a more peaceful world. But I believe our differences have been exaggerated and our areas of potential agreement severely underestimated, undercutting a potentially powerful blend of US “hard” and EU “soft” power. To make a simple analogy, our strengths are based on very different tools. US military might is unprecedented, a hammer that cannot be challenged or denied by any other military force. If it is true that the military is a necessary hammer in the tool box, it is equally true that not every problem is a nail. This has been painfully discovered in post-conflict Iraq as well, where the tools for winning peace through nation-building clearly diverge from those that helped win the war.

The EU’s defense capabilities are not inconsiderable, but the EU’s real strengths lie in the areas of development and humanitarian aid, reconstruction, conflict prevention and crisis management. One could be so bold as to describe such a mix of tools as ideal for nation-building, a skill that should be in high demand. Again, we must seek the best and most complementary blend of EU and US capabilities. As Chris Patten has asked, Would the world be better off if the resources devoted to EU development aid were instead spent on missiles?

I am hopeful that such an approach to transatlantic partnership can be realized. This would require full consultation, serious joint analysis and agreement on our common objectives, with both partners contributing its most effective tools. A review of our respective security strategies, with that of the EU still in process, reveals a remarkable similarity in our assessment of the threats and opportunities that we face. We both perceive the potential mixture of international terrorism, failed states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as our greatest security threat. The EU has much to offer in each area.

It is of course true and only fair to point out that the US national security strategy also addresses the issues of poverty and inequality in the developing world and the need to increase the amount and effectiveness of US development assistance, per President Bush’s announcement in Monterrey. EU-US cooperation is also crucial to the future of global trade – a fact noted in both documents.

I could give you more examples, but the message is the same: the EU and US have much to gain from working together on many issues, taking advantage of our respective strengths, with our cooperation crucial to achieving greater security at the international and regional levels. We will not find any other partners sharing to such a complete degree the same interests and values. I am heartened that a number of serious analyses underlining the importance of the transatlantic relationship have appeared in the last year, providing useful suggestions for taking it forward. This conference will no doubt make a valuable contribution to that debate.

Returning to Kagan, I seem to recall from my university days that it was only in the arms of Venus that Mars found peace. And their beautiful daughter was the goddess Harmonia.

Thank you. I look forward to your comments and questions.