The Emergence of the European Constitution: Its Meaning for Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship

The Emergence of the European Constitution: Its Meaning for Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship

Ambassador Dr. Guenter Burghardt
Head of Delegation
Delegation of the European Commission to the United States

Conference on “European Constitution: Opportunity or Threat,” Organized by The New Atlantic Initiative of the American Enterprise Institute and The Friedrich Naumann Stiftung

28 October 2003

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Introduction

I congratulate the New Atlantic Initiative of the American Enterprise Institute and the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung for organizing this timely event, which features so many distinguished speakers taking part in panels later today. I also congratulate you for arriving at such a provocative program title, which may explain the excellent turnout this morning. As far as I know the draft European Constitution does not constitute a security "threat" to our American friends in any conventional sense of the word, though perhaps our distinguished speakers who participated directly in the Convention have privileged information on that score. It is somewhat reassuring that you have given "opportunity" pride of place over "threat" as a possible outcome.

More seriously, I understand the importance of the current debate for transatlantic relations at a time when some analysts and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic view our relations as becoming less of a partnership and more of a competitive zero-sum game. Though I believe that view to be misguided, it must be addressed. From the American perspective it is also consistent with an orientation that, while historically quite supportive of European integration in principle, tends to greet new European initiatives with a mixture of ambivalence, trepidation and skepticism. Think of the initial reception given the single market, the euro, and ESDP.

As with those developments, I believe concerns that the draft Constitution will somehow establish an EU in the form of a superstate hell-bent on competition with the US are also misguided, to say the least. This view exaggerates the importance of the Constitution to be produced by the current IGC [Intergovernmental Conference], which seeks to make more efficient a political system already half a century in the making, while also underestimating the benefits to the US of a more capable European partner. In my view, the draft Constitution should be recognized as an important step forward in Europe’s continuing journey toward a more coherent federation of nation-states, more capable of playing a global political and security role commensurate with its economic capabilities.

The Draft Constitution and the Future of Europe

The draft Constitution was produced by the European Convention chaired by former French President Giscard d’Estaing, and is now being considered by the Intergovernmental Conference or "IGC" convened in Rome on the fourth of October. In terms of substance, the draft Constitutional treaty makes major strides in meeting the Union's new tasks and institutional architecture. Key elements of the draft include:

· conferral of a single legal personality on the Union;

· elimination of the EU’s current pillar structure, making the EU easier to understand and more transparent for its citizens;

· simplification and extension of qualified majority voting within the Council and greater use of the co-decision procedure empowering the Parliament;

· integration of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the constitutional treaty;

· clarification of the Union's powers, distinguishing more clearly between the Union's responsibilities and those of its member states;

· new provisions for the common foreign and security policy, including the creation of an EU "Minister for Foreign Affairs" joining the roles of [Javier] Solana [EU High Representative for Common Foreign & Security Policy] and [Chris] Patten [External Relations Commissioner], thereby enhancing the Union's international role; and

· provisions on defense enabling those member states willing and able to do so to engage in "enhanced cooperation," also strengthening the credibility of the EU's foreign policy.

These and other issues were the subject of extensive debate as the Convention settled on its draft during a very public process lasting more than a year. With the launch of the IGC, the hope is that the Constitution will be approved at the Brussels European Council in December, allowing for a new Treaty of Rome to be signed sometime thereafter.

The IGC will have to move quickly to meet that deadline, and the Italian Presidency will need to provide clear proposals facilitating consensus on a number of issues, particularly in reconciling the sometimes divergent interests of the "large" and "small" states. Issues likely to require further debate, including those where the Commission has offered its own views, include several that will be crucial to the effective future operation of the European Union:

· First, establishing a simple double majority for decision-making in the Council, currently proposed as 50% of the member states and 60% of the population, replacing the complex formula of the Nice Treaty.

· Second, determining the future composition and operation of the Commission, which the Convention draft suggests should consist of up to twenty-five Commissioners, but with voting privileges for only fifteen Commissioners at any one time, on a rotating basis. You will not be surprised to learn that the Commission opposes this plan. We believe it would detract from the collegiality and consensus that underpins the Commission’s work, while it also overlooks the simple fact that formal votes are the exception and not the rule.

· Another vital point is ensuring that parts of the Constitution can be amended in the future without recourse to another IGC. If changes have to be agreed and ratified unanimously by twenty-five or more different parties, this will mean in practice that any amendments, even on a more detailed policy issue, become almost impossible to be achieved.

Of course, to follow Lincoln, it is impossible to please all of the member states all of the time—an area where the Commission can speak with some authority—and the final draft of the Constitution will surely fail to meet the goals of any one member state to its complete satisfaction. What is crucial, however, both for its immediate legitimacy and its future workability, is that the Constitution represent a balanced effort to prepare the EU’s institutions and decision-making processes for a membership of twenty-five member states, and counting, and that it make the EU more understandable to our citizens.

Lessons from the US Constitution?

Some have criticized the draft EU Constitution text as being too long and complex, consisting of some four hundred articles, compared to the relatively concise American Constitution which has only seven articles and twenty-seven amendments. I would argue that this is an unfair comparison, particularly when you consider that the draft EU Constitution is based on the consolidation of multiple previous treaties between sovereign member states and that it includes provisions for specific policy areas. The US Constitution’s objective was to replace the Articles of Confederation and not to address policy issues beyond the delineation of institutional responsibilities.

That is not to say that many similarities cannot be found in comparing the evolution of the EU and US constitutional processes. Examples where our paths correspond include the need to establish divisions of competence between different levels of government, devise a system of representation for citizens and individual state units of disparate populations and make the constitution more relevant to the lives of our citizens.

Nor can it be denied that the US Constitution contains much to be admired. Perhaps most relevant to the present situation in the EU is the ability of the US framers to make simultaneously bold and closely measured proposals to achieve political compromise, while also providing a sufficiently flexible framework for governance by future generations. But just as we should not expect miracles of a new EU Constitution, neither should we idealize the US Constitution, which required civil war to settle the morally, economically and politically explosive issue of slavery. As Joseph Ellis makes clear in his fascinating study The Founding Brothers [New York: Knopf, 2000, ISBN: 0375405445], the American founders fully realized that they were engaged in an imperfect political exercise that had no pre-determined outcome. One marvels at what they accomplished, much as one can marvel at the humble beginnings and staggering accomplishments of the political process put in motion by Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, Spaak, de Gasperi and others.

Here again our program title is instructive. Rather than perceiving any successful outcome to the IGC as a "threat" to either the EU or the transatlantic relationship, the true threat is that the IGC will not take advantage of the opportunity to solidify the Convention draft in preparing Europe for its new challenges.

The EU Constitution and Transatlantic Relations

The EU’s constitutional debate occurs at a critical time for the transatlantic partnership. As you know, over the past year we have gone through a rocky period on a number of issues, most notably the war in Iraq. After more than half a century during which Americans and Europeans transformed shattered cities into thriving metropolises and stood shoulder-to-shoulder against oppression, we find our relationship at a crossroads.

Though we may currently disagree on fundamental aspects of our approaches to securing a more peaceful world, I believe our differences have been exaggerated and our areas of potential agreement severely underestimated, undercutting a potentially powerful blend of US "hard" and EU "soft" power. To make a simple analogy, our strengths are based on very different tools. US military might is unprecedented, a hammer that cannot be challenged or denied by any other military force. If it is true that the military is a necessary hammer in the tool box, it is equally true that not every problem is a nail. This has been painfully discovered in post-conflict Iraq as well, where the tools for winning peace through nation-building clearly diverge from those that helped win the war.

It is in the interests of both sides of the transatlantic partnership to identify better the common interests, goals and values we share and to make them work to our common advantage. The EU-US partnership has accomplished far more than most people recognize and covers a much broader spectrum of actions, in the political sphere, in crisis management and in addressing together the issues of poverty, development, global trade liberalization, counter-terrorism and other global issues. The positive agenda we share is more impressive than the divisive menu, though of course it is always the friction that captures the headlines.

In the economic realm, European integration will continue to offer enormous opportunities for the American economy. These opportunities became increasingly important particularly in times of a huge trade deficit and a cooling-off of the American economy after the long boom of the 1990s. In the not too distant future, a European Union with 500 million "market citizens," as the center and driving force of a larger European economic area with altogether one billion consumers, will be by far the largest export market of the world with excellent prospects for American enterprises. Let me also add that the [European] Commission has proposed to the IGC that economic policy coordination should be strengthened to ensure the sound public finance policies necessary for sustained economic growth.

It also follows that if the new Constitution helps the EU have a more effective political impact in the world, the benefits for the US will outweigh the negatives. We should seek to build a relationship that focuses more on what we can do together in the world in our mutual interests, while managing as best we can the issues which divide us.

As Commission President Romano Prodi has noted, the Convention made a good beginning. Still, we do not yet know whether the IGC will succeed in definitively establishing the finalité politique that eluded European leaders at Nice. One thing is clear, however: whatever the outcome, it will be important to the US. A Europe that knows its own destiny, that more clearly delineates what is done at the community level and what is done at state or local level, and that is better able to define its place in the world, would have profound implications for the US. Washington could hardly avoid engaging such a European Union in an even closer partnership than the one we already enjoy and on a footing of greater consultation and equality. Conversely, if the final Constitution text fails to make much headway, the US might draw less positive conclusions about Europe's capacity as a world partner.

Much will also depend on how the US chooses to react to a more capable EU in specific policy areas, such as security and defense policy. Though we have not yet seen the use of the "three Ds" popularized during the Clinton Administration, the current Administration’s reaction—some have said over-reaction—to the quite preliminary discussion of potential enhanced cooperation among several EU member states on defense issues indicates that we will have growing pains as the process goes forward.

Conclusion

The bottom line is that the US has little to lose and much to gain from a successful IGC and the adoption of a strong European Constitution. If Europe takes a more coherent posture in world affairs, and develops more streamlined decision-making processes, it could work more efficiently with the US to tackle crises in real time.

It will also serve our mutual interests across the Atlantic for the EU to develop its capacities better to respond to the challenges of globalization, to harness its resources more effectively for conflict resolution and crisis management and to apply its talents and its collective political will to the solution of intractable global problems. If the cost is an enhanced capacity in Europe to stand up to the US on political issues when we have a different view, this should be viewed as evidence of more profound partnership rather than any kind of threat to US interests. The quid pro quo is harnessing the enormous collective weight of the transatlantic partners together in pursuit of common goals and interests in political affairs, foreign policy, security and diplomacy, much as we have done in successive rounds of multilateral trade liberalization.

More than 40 years ago, President John F. Kennedy foresaw the day when a "Declaration of Interdependence" would exist between Europe and the United States. His remarks were rich in symbolism because they were delivered in 1962 on July 4—the American Independence Day—in Independence Hall in Philadelphia. Kennedy’s far-sighted concept, based on "a transatlantic partnership of equals," anticipated the moment we are rapidly approaching. I can do no better than to commend President Kennedy’s vision to you as a most productive response to the European Constitution and the European Union it will define.